Foreign states' amicus curiae briefs submitted before the U.S. courts are a special type of pleading. This article analyzes such submissions made in U.S. antitrust cases during the period 1978-2015, identifying which foreign nations used amicus briefs to present their views and what sort of issues attracted their attention. This piece examines also the issue of deference due to such filings, arguing that while foreign states' submissions should be treated respectfully, they do not warrant a dispositive effect. Furthermore, this article outlines the practice of filing, explaining the shift from diplomatic correspondence towards amicus curiae submissions and the creation of a niche market of authoring them. It also indicates general trends in relation to stages of filings and the degree of their prevalence. Some broader comments are offered on the functions of foreign nations' amicus filings and their contribution to the on-going development of competition law and policy internationally.
I. Introduction
Antitrust cases involving foreign defendants are not new to the U.S. courts. Some of them relate to transnational or purely foreign conduct affecting U.S. markets. Until relatively recently outside the U.S. there has been little appetite for and few actual cases of similar transnational enforcement of domestic competition laws. 1 In effect, the international competition law jurisprudence for a long time was shaped in actions before the U.S. courts.
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Foreign nations began communicating directly with U.S. courts due to a change in the Supreme Court's rules relating to such submissions, embraced also by the lower courts. Moreover, a few practitioners successfully developed a specific niche market of authoring and facilitating amicus filing, arguing that presentation of views by means of amicus submissions may be more effective than reliance on diplomatic correspondence. This development might have fueled an increasing interest in amicus briefs. Although foreign nations intervene at all stages of litigation, filings at the district court level are much more frequent than at higher levels. While typically governments file the briefs, submissions made by individual foreign ministries or competition agencies point to a new trend.
Although the extent to which courts actually defer to foreign states' submissions remains unknown, amicus briefs are an important type of pleadings. They can facilitate adjudication, especially in cases requiring consideration of foreign laws, procedures and policies. They constitute unilateral acts of states and when pertaining to issues of international law, they have the capacity to influence its development. Whether submitted out of a genuine sovereignty-related concern or being successfully solicited by defense counsel, foreign nations' amicus submissions should not be too easily discounted. Foreign states are no ordinary friends of the court. Courts are well-advised to deal with foreign states' amicus filings in an accommodating and respectful 
II. The scope of the project
This article investigates amicus briefs submitted by foreign nations in U.S. antitrust litigation, relying on a broad notion of a state encompassing not only governments in the strict sense, but also antitrust agencies (regardless of the level of autonomy they enjoy domestically, or the fact that they may be supranational, such as the European Commission). Submissions made by foreign states' subdivisions are not included, as they carry a lesser weight in the fields of international law and international relations.
7 Both formal and de facto amicus briefs are considered. The latter category includes statements in forms such as letters sent directly to a court, or documents attached to a party's own filing. Since these materials were considered by courts and drafted for such a purpose, they constitute de facto amicus briefs.
From a temporal perspective, this study focuses on briefs submitted in cases decided between 1978 and 2015. In 1978 an important policy change took place. Foreign nations were invited to communicate any concerns in relation to cases pending before the U.S court directly to them. interests to warrant such filing and recommended Australia to file an amicus brief.
The new practice explicitly concerned foreign states' amicus submissions to the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal. A similar practice was followed before district courts. In
Matsushita, in 1975-that is before the policy change-a Japanese ministry passed on its views to the District Court in a form of a letter transferred through the State Department. 23 For some time it was unclear, for the court, 24 whether the ministry's views should be considered as views of the Japanese government as a sovereign state. In 1980-after the policy change-this issue was addressed, in the positive, in a letter sent to the trial court by the Japanese ambassador. 25 The plaintiffs moved to strike the letter on the grounds that it was not transmitted through diplomatic channels. 26 The motion was denied. While recognizing that the State Department's new policy explicitly related to presentation of views before the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals, the Court found that 'in order to promote consistent practice' foreign states' views should be communicated directly also to the district courts. Since there is no equivalent of an amicus brief in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court found the form of a letter entirely appropriate.
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The change of policy on the proper way of communicating foreign states' views in cases pending before the U.S. courts reflected the growing consensus in the U.S. administration that there was no reason (both from international and domestic perspectives) why foreign nations should not present their views directly to U.S. courts. 28 The new policy allowed the administration to remain formally uninvolved. It decreased the political pressure on the U.S. government to take a position on a matter involved, judicializing the process. While the administration retains its right to intervene if needs be-by filing its own brief-the new policy liberated the executive from the need to get involved in every case. It is also a more efficient arrangement, saving the administration's resources without constraining its capacity to act. 
Professionalization and authoring of briefs
The diplomatic notes traditionally filed with the State Department were diplomatic documents.
Albeit often carrying informed protests, these were rather short and polite statements of concern. 
Solo v joint submissions
Amicus briefs can be submitted singly (by one state) or jointly (by numerous states). The latter is a rarer practice, but a joint submission may be seen as carrying a greater weight than separate filings, since it represents a common position. This is especially so when the brief deals with points of international law, which are shaped by state practice.
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The first joint foreign states' amicus submitted before the U.S. courts (in any field of law) was the brief of four governments-Australia, Canada, France and the UK 45 -submitted to the Supreme Court in Matsushita. 46 Interestingly, unlike the Japanese submissions in this case, the joint brief did not deal with the subject-matter of the case. It focused on the issue of deference due to foreign states' amicus submissions. 47 The broadest in authorship-in an antitrust case-was the joint brief submitted by five governments-Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK 48 -on remand in Empagran. 49 In that case foreign states submitted also two other joint briefs to the Supreme Court (see Table 1 
Stages of amicus filings and their general prevalence
There are two noticeable general trends pertaining to foreign nations' amicus filings. First, although in the examined cases foreign states filed amicus briefs at all stages of litigation (see Table 2 below), filings made at the district court level were most frequent. This may be seen as rather unexpected, especially given that the U.S. government rarely files amicus briefs in the lower courts. The early engagement has the benefit of informing adjudication early on, potentially influencing the litigation so as to avoid reaching any contentious outcomes. Additionally, the more recent amicus submissions by foreign antitrust agencies often concerned discovery, hence a matter dealt with at the early stage of litigation. This platform of cooperation helps to build trust between regimes. By doing so, it may be also, albeit inadvertently, encouraging foreign nations to file amicus briefs in the U.S. courts with the hope that U.S. courts will be as receptive and sensitive to arguments as the U.S. officials taking part in the working of the ICN.
Overall, these phenomena mean that transnational enforcement in the U.S. is now more likely to be of particular interest in foreign capitals. This trend is likely to continue and one should expect more foreign nations' amicus filings in the U.S courts in the future. 
IV. Analyzing the briefs
The identification of antitrust cases in which foreign nations submitted amicus briefs is one of the original contributions of this research. 54 No other similar listing existed before or was publicly available. Although the amicus briefs, unless filed under seal, are public documents, this does not translate into ease of access, which is hindered by lack of comprehensiveness of the legal research databases, especially regarding the district courts level and also, in general, older cases. 55 Some of the older filings are retrievable through the U.S. National Archives 56 or were reprinted in secondary sources.
In the analysed period (1978-2015) 28 cases were identified (see Table 3 below). There were in total 67 instances of foreign states' amicus curiae participations. The number of cases represents only a fraction of all transnational cases decided by the U.S. courts. 57 While the collected data is not dispositive, it is suggestive. Spectrum Stores 58 is the case with the highest number of foreign nations' amicus participations (13 states filed briefs). 54 The presented listing was composed after analysing judgements (and dockets), available online, in antitrust cases involving transnational elements. Three leading legal databases were used: BlumbergLaw, LexisNexis and Westlaw. Members of the U.S. and International Advisory Boards of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies at the Loyola University Chicago were consulted about the list in a crowd-sourcing exercise. Although every effort was made to identify all relevant briefs, the list is likely to undercount them, especially those filed in the earlier part of the analysed period. 55 Similar limitations apply to the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system. PACER is not a unified database. Each court maintains its own holdings. Available filings range from copies of docket lists to copies of some or all briefs. PACER covers only up to the last fifteen years. 56 Courts hand over older case files to the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), some of which are retained. None are being digitalized. NARA has numerous branches in the U.S. The holdings are available only locally and there are no inter-branch loans. 57 It is unclear how many such cases were decided in that period. 58 Spectrum Stores, supra n 52. While foreign states' amicus briefs are rare, they are becoming more frequent. In the first two decades of the analysed period transnational antitrust cases were quite sporadic. If one looks at the public enforcement efforts then, international cartels-arguably the most common transnational antitrust violation-became a central focus of the DoJ Antitrust Division only in 1996. 60 Beforehand, the prosecutions involving foreign firms were less frequent, reflecting the general retrenchment of antitrust enforcement in the Reagan administration (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) 65 The place of the private suits in the U.S. antitrust regime was best encapsulated by the Supreme Court-'the purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws'. Perma Mufflers v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) . 66 See below notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
Therefore, the likelihood of causing international tension and provoking foreign nations to participate as amici is greater, and-as discussed below-most of the identified foreign states' briefs were filed in private suits, be it stand alone or follow-on cases.
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When it comes to public enforcement foreign states' interests would often have been taken into account on an a priori basis. In cases brought by the U.S. antitrust agencies, which exercise prosecutorial discretion, there is scope for filtering out potential friction. 68 Any remaining controversies (in the perception of other nations) would concern issues in regard to which the U.S.
authorities had particularly strong views. This may explain why there were only three cases of public enforcement involving foreign states' amicus submissions (see Table 7 below), including only one criminal case-Nippon Paper.
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The impact of the foreign states' amicus briefs in particular cases is difficult to appraise.
Courts do not state the reasons for their judgments in an unambiguous manner. They also tend not to ascribe any particular weight to amicus filings when a case outcome is amicus-friendly.
Nevertheless, even in cases in which courts did not discuss or refer to amicus briefs in their opinions, it cannot be ruled out that arguments raised in such submissions did influence their judgement.
Who are the foreign amici?
In most of the analysed cases the foreign states which participated as amicus curiae were developed nations. 70 The European Commission was the most frequent filer (eight participations), followed 67 This point was made recently by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in its brief submitted in Motorola Mobility, in which it opposed extraterritorial assertions sought by the private plaintiffs. The METI observed that 'giving private U.S. attorneys, which do not bear responsibility in international diplomacy and cooperation, the right to interfere with Japanese governmental regulation of the Japanese market is troublesome. ' 74 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, supra n 12.
From a practical perspective one is likely to sue a foreign entity only when the prospects for successful enforcement (effective relief) are realistic. One of the greatest challenges of transnational litigation is gaining access to evidence, which may be located abroad. This applies to both public and private enforcement.
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In the former case, until the late 1990s-in order to obtain evidence and facilitate effective investigation of international cartels-the DoJ was often settling for fines instead of seeking indictments in exchange for cooperation ('no-jail' deals).
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In the private actions context, prior to bringing a case plaintiffs need to consider, apart from the issue of handling discovery, the potential for recovery of any damages awards. When foreign entities have assets in the U.S., this issue is generally not problematic. 77 In rarer cases-where there are no assets in the U.S. from which the plaintiffs could collect, the situation gets more (F.R.G.) . Similarly, punitive damages are not available in Japan. The Japanese Supreme Court refused to recognize and enforce the part of the U.S. damages award which was exemplary and punitive finding that it would be against Japanese public policy. Ore. State Union No-so-kon I v. Mansei Kogyo Co., Judgment of Supreme Court on July 11, 1997, Minshu 51-6-2573. In fact, in the past many states introduced legislation 20 that successful recovery is more likely in a forum which has a generally similar regulatory system to the U.S. Therefore, few foreign nations' amicus filings of other than developed nations reflect generally lower numbers of private actions brought against defendants based in such states, which can be partly explained by a lower likelihood of effective recovery. going through a more stringent intra-agency process, whereas submission of a letter to a judge may only require the attention of a head of unit within the agency.
Submissions of foreign antitrust agencies are another indicator of continuing juridification of transnational legal disputes. They suggest growing trust in and progressing understanding of each other's legal processes. To file a brief, a foreign agency must have a certain level of trust in U.S.
procedures and believe that a U.S. court will consider its arguments. Otherwise, it would likely seek an intervention at the executive level with a view to soliciting U.S. government intervention before the court hearing the case.
Distinguishable strands of cases
Analysis of foreign states' amicus submissions from the perspective of their focus allows the identification of a few general strands of cases. These are cases dealing with: (1) jurisdiction and permissible limits of transnational application of U.S. antitrust laws, (2) discoverability of documents related to foreign antitrust investigations, 84 (3) foreign states' involvement in anticompetitive conduct, (4) regulation of exploitation of natural resources (see Table 5 below). 
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Similar reasoning applies to recent cases dealing with discoverability of leniency-related materials. The amici argued that the sought discovery would undermine their own important policies-their leniency programs.
86 Similar considerations were raised in cases concerning state involvement in the challenged conduct or in actions concerning exploitation of natural resources.
In these latter few cases the opposition against applicability of U.S. antitrust laws to such activities was particularly forceful.
The protection of one's own prerogatives was not undertaken for its own sake. The legislative choices and policies have clear impact on national economies. The acceptance of foreign prescriptions may negatively affect the competitiveness of domestic businesses. It creates an additional cost. Moreover, in the context of U.S. antitrust actions, it is also the question of exposure to private suits and treble damages, which may not be available in the foreign defendants' home states. 87 In fact, some foreign nations' amicus curiae submissions may be, in essence, mercantilist.
They may be motivated directly by the interests of defendants. The amicus briefs may be submitted in order to shield the foreign defendants from liability in the U.S., even if their conduct was anticompetitive. From a pragmatic perspective, fines or damages in a transnational context represent a transfer of wealth from home to a foreign jurisdiction and therefore should be avoided.
Given the significant inter-linkages between major economies, it is unlikely that any nation would be pursuing a purely mercantilist agenda, yet its echoes may nevertheless be heard in some acts or policies, including in representations made in the form of amicus curiae briefs. Suffice it to note that although there is now an international consensus as to the harmful nature of price-fixing In Alcoa, a case concerning an international cartel of aluminum producers, Judge Learned Hand formulated the effects doctrine by famously stating it was 'settled law' that states may apply their laws to foreign entities for their foreign conduct if it affects the domestic market, thereby setting a precedent and allowing for a far-reaching transnational enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws. The holding in Alcoa was, most likely, contrary to international law, yet at that time no foreign state protested. Rosenthal and Knighton noted that 'until a decade after Alcoa was decided, the [U.S.] was virtually alone in promoting the effects doctrine as a valid basis for claiming the right to apply its antitrust law to regulate conduct beyond its borders. Virtually every other developed nation was in opposition. ' 95 Empagran, supra n 5. The case arose from private class actions against an international price-fixing vitamin cartel, following successful public enforcement in the U.S. and other jurisdictions. The question was whether U.S. jurisdiction extends to claims of foreign purchasers from a global cartel that operated also in the U.S. In other words, whether the doors to the U.S. courtrooms (and treble damages awards) are open to all victims of global conspiracies. The Supreme Court had to construe the 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act. Ultimately, the Court answered in the negative, in line with representations made by numerous foreign states' amici, although it delivered its ruling in the context of a carefully and very narrowly framed scenario.
In the longer-term the trend to further challenge the limits of extraterritoriality in antitrust is bound to continue, since-as earlier indicated 96 -the generous U.S. rules on damages and plaintiffs-friendly discovery provide strong incentives for private plaintiffs to keep testing them.
Amicus briefs will remain a tool which foreign states will be using to intervene and protest when deemed necessary.
The recent Motorola Mobility case is the best example of this with four foreign nations getting involved as amici curiae. The U.S. plaintiff sued foreign cartelists for fixing prices of components which were incorporated by the plaintiff's foreign affiliates into products which were subsequently sold by the plaintiff in the U.S. As in Empagran 97 the crux was the interpretation of the poorly worded Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA). The case first led to the filing of an amicus brief by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) arguing against the extraterritorial assertions sought by the plaintiff. 98 The District Court found that under the FTAIA U.S. jurisdiction does not extend to such claims. 99 The decision was affirmed on interlocutory appeal. 100 Commission filed briefs opposing the far-reaching extraterritorial assertions as sought by the plaintiff. 102 Notably, the defendants in this case were based in these three foreign jurisdictions.
in their opposition. 103 The Japanese METI filed another brief. 104 The case involved also the U.S.
government's foreign amici participation in support of neither party. Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit affirmed its earlier opinion. 105 In an amicus-friendly manner, the plaintiff was found to be unable to sue foreign price-fixers under U.S. antitrust law for overcharges paid by its foreign subsidiaries in relation to their foreign transactions. However, the Court's reading of the FTAIA does not, in any way, limit the scope for extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law by the government agencies in such cases.
Discoverability of documents related to foreign proceedings
The emergence of foreign antitrust agencies' amicus curiae submissions is a new development.
Within the analyzed period ten cases involved such representations (see Table 6 below). But for
Intel v. AMD and Motorola Mobility, foreign agencies-mostly, but not only the European Commission-filed briefs at the district court level. All submissions but for two (both filed in Motorola Mobility) concerned discoverability of documents related to foreign amici's own antitrust investigations within the framework of leniency programs. 106 The foreign amici participated to protect their policies' credibility. The documents, in which discoverability for the sake of U.S litigation was contested, while held by the parties were at the same time considered at least confidential in the foreign fora. As noted above, in a broader sense the issue of discoverability falls within the notion of enforcement jurisdiction. 107 Hence it also raises the question of the permissible limits of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction, albeit in its enforcement and not in the prescriptive sense.  † ACCC did not file a formal amicus brief. The defendants submitted an affidavit of ACCC's Chief Executive Officer. Since it was a statement created for the purposes of this litigation and served as a de facto amicus brief it is included in this listing. * The brief was formally filed by the Attorney General of Canada, but it represents the interests of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Competition Bureau (as explicitly stated in its first paragraph), and hence it is included in this listing.
‡ The brief of the U.S. was submitted in support of neither party.
Foreign antitrust agencies were reasonably successful in convincing U.S. courts that the sought discovery should at least be limited in scope. This might have been facilitated by the requirement, under Aerospatiale, 108 to consider foreign interests before ordering extraterritorial discovery. However, the foreign amici did not manage to convince U.S. courts to adopt a general rule against discoverability of such documents. 109 Given the frequent representations of foreign antitrust agencies before U.S. courts on this matter (as compared with other issues raised by them in the same period), the issue of discoverability of foreign investigations-related documents emerges as one of the most topical issues in international antitrust, calling for its more systemic resolution.
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The issue of deference
A foreign state is no ordinary amicus filer. Firstly, it is best placed to comment on its own laws, procedures, and policies. Secondly, its public statements-such as amicus briefs-are unilateral acts under international law. They may serve as a reference point in determining rules of customary international law. 
